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In their thoughtful article,' Professors Dogan and Lemley discard
more all-encompassing versions of the trademark use requirement (in which
every infringement allegation would be subjected to a threshold inquiry into
whether defendant's use constituted a use as a mark). Instead, they seek to
delineate and defend a "more surgical form" of trademark use doctrine,"
meaning one that is intended only to protect defendants that are employing
marks for something other than the branding of their own products or
services.3 Thus, as Dogan and Lemley now say, trademark use should not be
viewed as "a panacea, a silver bullet, or a wonder theory."4 We applaud
Dogan and Lemley for seeking to advance the trademark use debate by
narrowing it and for attempting to stuff the trademark use genie partly back
into its bottle. But we remain unconvinced that the trademark use doctrine
will serve the goals of the trademark system, regardless of whether the
doctrine can be cabined successfully in accord with the Dogan and Lemley
reformulation.
Although our analysis diverges from that of Dogan and Lemley in many
respects, we have selected two general points of disagreement on which to
focus in this brief Article. First, Dogan and Lemley's latest arguments
haven't altered our views as to the correct interpretation of the Lanham Act,
as detailed below in Part I. We still aren't persuaded that the language of the
Lanham Act imposes a trademark use requirement, even when that
requirement is defined "surgically" and sections 32 and 43(a) are read
"fluidly," as Dogan and Lemley suggest. Moreover, this more nuanced
interpretation still renders section 33(b)(4) redundant and unduly limits
appropriate common law development of trademark law.5
Second, as we discuss in Part II, we are unmoved by Dogan and
Lemley's additional normative arguments for deploying trademark use to
shield defendants from even potential liability for various commercial uses of
marks, especially in connection with online contextual advertising. Dogan
and Lemley would minimize direct liability for search engines by applying
the trademark use doctrine but would reintroduce some marginal amount
of regulation by leaving the threat of contributory infringement liability. We
1. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use,
92 IowA L. REV. 1669 (2007) (responding to Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion
Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007)).
2. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1696 (conceding that some of the concerns
expressed in Confusion Over Use "may argue against an expansive approach to trademark use"
but asserting that "none of them justifies rejection of the more surgical form of the doctrine"
that Dogan and Lemley discuss).
3. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1685 & n.69.
4. Id. at 1673 (conceding that the doctrine "has significant limitations that curtail its
efficacy" but claiming that those limitations only arise in "marginal cases").
5. Dogan and Lemley's critique implicates important questions about the extent to which
the Lanham Act leaves judges free to develop common law defenses, as we discuss in Part I
herein. See also Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1615 & nn. 79-80, 1616 & nn.82.
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still believe that this would fail to create sufficient oversight of either the
6presentation of search results or advertising sales practices. In addition, we
disagree that marginalizing trademark law will best encourage
intermediaries to structure their business arrangements in ways that
promote reliable information flow to consumers while balancing the rights
of trademark owners and their competitors. In fact, the opposite is true: in
the shadow of the threat of potential liability, some search engines have
begun to restructure their business practices, undertaking what we perceive
are good faith efforts to respect trademark rights. Lastly, we disagree with
Dogan and Lemley that offline analogies should necessarily direct the
outcomes of trademark disputes over online practices.8 In particular, we
don't think that the practice of grocery stores placing rival products in close
proximity to one another on store shelves tells us much about whether
Internet search engines should be liable for keyword sales, and we worry that
the rhetorical potency of grocery store metaphors (and the like) will lure
courts into assimilating online and offline conduct without carefully
assessing the differences in online and offline contexts.
Our disagreements on these points also highlight broader differences
about methodological approaches to trademark law, some of which we
identified in Confusion Over Use,9 others of which we discuss throughout this
Article. In particular, our distaste for limiting the potential scope of the
Lanham Act reveals our greater willingness to see trademark and unfair
competition law as a market regulator. Relatedly, we are more firmly
committed to judicial development of both potential liability and potential
defenses; Dogan and Lemley want courts to focus only on the latter. Our
view is supported both by the theory of the Lanham Act as a common law
system operating within a statutory framework and by our faith in the
institutional benefits of common law lawmaking at a time of political tumult
in intellectual property law.
Indeed, the insights to be gained from this broader methodological
debate may prove to be the most useful byproduct of the trademark use
controversy. They may provide lessons for trademark law that will be
valuable long after the current spate of litigation over online contextual
advertising has subsided.
6. See infra Part H.A.
7. See infra Part H.B.
8. See infra Part HI.C.
9. See, e.g., Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1603-05 & nn.25-36, 1635-39 & nn.178-
89, 1652-53 & nn.256-61, 1654-56 & nn.268-86, 1658 & nn.290-93.
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I. TRADEMARK USE AND THE LANHAM ACT'S RAGGED EDGES
A. ABUSE OF THE "USE IN COMMERCE "DENrFIION
As we outlined in Confusion Over Use,'0 trademark use proponents have
invoked (1) section 45's definition of "use in commerce" (a phrase that also
appears in sections 32 and 43(a)), and (2) the "in connection with" clauses
in sections 32 and 43(a), in their efforts to establish Lanham Act grounding
for their notions of trademark use. Dogan and Lemley provide a particularly
nuanced analysis that only partially endorses these prior interpretations
while also exposing numerous problems with them." Ultimately, they prove
more about the Lanham Act's imperfections than about trademark use.
12
On the appropriateness of relying on section 45's "use in commerce"
definition, Dogan and Lemley's Article yields significant ground. Dogan and
Lemley concede that use concepts appearing in different parts of the
Lanham Act need not have "complete consistency in meaning," 13 that the
differences in meaning "turn[] on the context," 14 and that "the scope of use
sufficient to establish a trademark as a source-identifier in the minds of the public
is [different] than the scope of use sufficient to tamper with that role and thus
commit infringement."' 15 Yet Dogan and Lemley attempt to salvage something
from the inclusion of the phrase "use in commerce" in the infringement
10. Id. at 1608-15.
11. Dogan and Lemley also argue that the existence of the doctrine of contributory
infringement provides implicit support for a trademark use requirement. We respond to that
claim separately. See infra Part II.
12. The Lanham Act is replete with drafting inconsistencies. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003) (discussing 1995
dilution laws); Robert A. Christensen, Trademark Incontestability-Time for the Next Step, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1196, 1196 (1966) (discussing incontestability provisions); Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98-102
(2006) (discussing inconsistencies relating to the 2006 revision of the law of dilution).
13. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1688; accord Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at
1610-11. As we pointed out in Confusion Over Use, the legislative history indicates that the "use
in commerce" definition relates to the establishment of trademark rights, not to infringement.
See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1611 n.62.
14. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1688; accord Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at
1611-14.
15. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1688. Given Dogan and Lemley's claim that this
proposition is in accord with Confusion Over Use, we assume they mean to argue that the range
of uses that can interfere with consumer understanding is greater than the range of uses that
can create it. See id. at 1676, 1687-88 (suggesting this reading); see also Dinwoodie &Janis, supra
note 1, at 1612, 1624-25. However, in one passage of their article, Dogan and Lemley note that
"the scope of use sufficient to establish a trademark as a source-identifier in the minds of the
public is greater than the scope of use sufficient to tamper with that role and thus commit
infringement." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1688. If that (inverted) proposition is in fact
what Dogan and Lemley intended to assert, then we remain in disagreement; but the balance of
references in their Article leads us to believe that we are, as they suggest, in agreement on this
point.
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provisions. Under their approach, the "strict definition" in section 45 would
be "inapplicable to infringement" determinations.16 However, courts
deciding infringement could take a "more fluid approach" to the language
of the section 45 definition in order to give it some relevance in
infringement determinations.
7
This selective fidelity to statutory text may validate the very
interpretation that Dogan and Lemley repudiate. In a number of keyword-
advertising cases, courts grappling with the trademark use doctrine have
cited the section 45 definition and have included language in their opinions
suggesting that they are accepting uncritically the proposition that the use
required to establish rights is the same as that required to infringe rights. 8
For example, courts have attempted to analyze whether selling or buying a
keyword is an act of "placing" a mark on goods or an act of "displaying" a
mark in connection with services.' 9 Thus, some courts appear to be leaning
towards treating use as a monolithic concept-the very conclusion that
Dogan and Lemley themselves now disown. 0 This illustrates what might
16. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1676.
17. Id.
18. The Second Circuit's 1-800 Contacts opinion encourages such an analysis. See 1-800
Contacts v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407-08 (2d Cir. 2005) (reciting the section 45
definition); id. at 410 (asserting that "[t]he fatal flaw with [the lower court's] holding is that
WhenU's pop-up ads do not display the 1-800 trademark").
19. See, e.g., Site Pro-i, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1700
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The key question is whether defendant placed plaintiffs trademark on any
goods, displays, containers, or advertisements, or used plaintiffs trademarks in any way that
indicates source or origin."); Rescue.com Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403
(N.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Defendant's internal use of plaintiffs trademark to trigger sponsored links is
not a use of a trademark within the meaning of the Lanham Act, either because there is no
allegation that defendant places plaintiffs trademark on any goods, containers, displays, or
advertisements, or that its internal use is visible to the public."); Hamzik v. Zale
Corp./Delaware, No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WAL 1174863, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) (reciting
the "display" language but finding trademark use). Other courts that make less of the section 45
definition have instead tended to focus on whether the defendant's activities were commercial
in nature. See, e.g., Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323
(D.N.J. 2006) (finding trademark use); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. Goto.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d
273, 285 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding trademark use).
20. Dogan and Lemley also have argued that the "use in commerce" phrase additionally
should be read to inform the "in connection with" requirement such that, when read together,
the phrases support recognition of a Dogan and Lemley trademark use requirement. Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 1, at 1676. But that complex interpretation doesn't comport with clear
language in the statute. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at 1610-14. For example, the "in
connection with" clause doesn't mesh well with the section 45 definition, at least as to goods. See
id. at 1610; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1675-76 (acknowledging that the
infringement provisions encompass a defendant's "advertising" but designating such an activity
as a section 45 use in commerce would arguably stretch the definition of use in commerce).
Moreover, section 43(a) (1) imposes liability on "[a]ny person who, on or in connection with
any goods or services .... uses in commerce any word . . .which is likely to cause confusion
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The Dogan and Lemley definition
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happen when courts embrace the so-called "fluid" approach to interpreting
the infringement provisions.
B. THE SECTION 33(b)(4) DEiENSE
Even setting these problems aside, the Dogan and Lemley
21reformulation for trademark use still doesn't square with section 33(b) (4).
Given the fact that section 33(b)(4) expressly preserves a defense for some
non-trademark uses,22 interpreting the infringement provisions as impliedly
filtering out all non-trademark uses would render the defense superfluous.23
This conflict occurs whether trademark use is defined broadly or surgically;
it's no answer to claim, as Dogan and Lemley do, that by defining trademark
use restrictively, their trademark use doctrine doesn't "tread into the
24territory" of the section 33(b) (4) defense.
C. THE ROLEbR COMMON LA WDEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW
This debate about the relationship between trademark use doctrines
and the language of section 33(b) (4) implicates broader concerns about the
extent to which the Lanham Act allows for further common law
development of trademark doctrines.6 Dogan and Lemley say that the fact
that Congress has codified a specific defense (such as the section 33(b)(4)
defense) should not preclude courts from developing others26 and that we
must be rejecting this proposition (i.e., that we must be arguing that section
33(b) freezes the development of the common law) because we favor
interpreting the Lanham Act so as to give some meaning to section
33(b) (4). However, as we pointed out in Confusion Over Use, our contextual
approach contemplates that courts will continue to develop defenses as they
are called upon to balance confusion-avoidance values against other values
of trademark use would limit the statute to only a defendant's use of a term to promote its own
goods and services.
21. 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (preserving the defense "[t]hat the use of the name, term, or
device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark.., of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services"
of the party alleged to infringe).
22. Namely, those non-trademark uses (uses "otherwise than as a mark") that are
undertaken in good faith.
23. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at 1615-16; cf Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at
1684 (disagreeing). Dogan and Lemley do make an important concession in this regard,
however. They admit that "[i]f the trademark use doctrine became a standard inquiry in every
trademark case, including those involving defendants that sell their own products under the
mark, then the trademark use doctrine might swallow subsidiary doctrines, including
descriptive fair use." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1684 n. 66.
24. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1684 n.66.
25. Id. at 1684-86.
26. Id.
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in new contexts. 7 And we believe that the trademark statute provides them
plenty of room do so.28
We do recognize that section 33(b) may limit judicial capacity to
develop new defenses as to incontestable marks.' Dogan and Lemley argue that
to accept this proposition is to conclude that there could be no nominative
fair use defense after incontestability.3 0 But we agree with the Third Circuit
that the line between descriptive and nominative fair use is a fine one and
that the language of section 33(b) (4) could accommodate many
applications of the nominative fair use doctrine." Courts would simply have
to accept that many so-called nominative uses also do describe the
characteristics of the products or services offered by a defendant, even if
they do so by reference to the plaintiff's product or services.
32
27. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at 1656-58. Moreover, as we explained in
Confusion Over Use, we favor analyzing permitted uses within the scope of the fair use defense,
rather than under a threshold assessment of trademark use, because this allows the testing of
the defendant's good faith and enables us to differentiate between good and bad actors. See id.
at 1616 n.85, 1631-33. Section 33(b)(4), like many of the defenses that courts have developed
to permit unauthorized third party uses, contains seeds of the unfair competition and
commercial ethics motivation that historically had driven American trademark law. See Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1830, 1848, 1860
(2007). The skepticism that Dogan and Lemley exhibit toward analysis of free riding and
commercial ethics, see Dogan and Lemley, supra note 1, at 1692-93, merely highlights the
narrowness of law and economics as the lodestar of trademark law. They imply that analysis of
search costs is objective but that any concern for commercial ethics reflected in notions of
inappropriate free riding will dissolve into unpredictable subjectivity. See id.. Yet, courts are able
to make decisions about commercial ethics. They did so historically in the development of
trademark and unfair competition law. See McKenna, supra, at 1848, 1860. Foreign courts do
likewise. And perhaps American courts are doing something similar when they assess good faith
in determining whether a fair use defense has been made out. Developing a "normative
baseline" for commercial ethics is not radically harder than definitively determining the search
costs involved in the new use of trademarks in a commercial environment that we do not yet
fully understand.
28. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1615, 1658.
29. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994). And, of course, given the purpose of incontestability, this is
appropriate. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
30. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1685. Although Dogan and Lemley make the
assertion without express reference to incontestability, it is only in the context of alleged
infringement of incontestable marks that their assertion raises any substantial issue. In the
context of infringement generally, courts have always developed defenses as a matter of
common law and still have broad latitude to do so. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
31. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 239 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting the affinity between descriptive and nominative fair use). Moreover, some scholars have
speculated that the broad language of the fair use provision in the new dilution law might
provide a basis for judicial expansion of the fair use defense in trademark law more generally.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Of Mutant Copyrights, Mangled Trademarks, and Barbie's Beneficence: The
Influence of Copyright on Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.Janis eds., 2008) (forthcoming).
32. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 239. An alternative way to deal with a
concern that defenses might be limited unduly after incontestability is to adapt the likelihood
1709
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Thus, our approach to section 33(b) (4) does not preclude appropriate
judicial development of common law defenses. We simply rely on the
language of section 33 of the statute to inform our interpretation of the
meaning of other provisions of the statute, and, as we explained in Confusion
Over Use, those interpretations comport with teleological understandings of
trademark law, as well as the legislative history of the Lanham Act.
Moreover, Dogan and Lemley's affection for common law development
is selective. They stoutly defend the authority of courts to develop common
law defenses to trademark claims, but they resist the proposition that courts
should also have authority to adapt trademark law to cover new commercial
uses of trademarks that were not previously litigated because the technology
and commercial practices were unknown until recently. We do not find
common law evolution of trademark principles either revolutionary or
unique. Unlike Dogan and Lemley, we endorse the common law
development of trademark law both with regard to potentially infringing acts
and potentially permitted uses.
Even with the enactment of the Lanham Act, federal trademark and
unfair competition law has retained its common law character.3 Trademarks
exist as a matter of common law; the Lanham Act is primarily a device by
which to facilitate federal registration and federal enforcement of rights
recognized at common law. Of course, Congress has, on occasion, explicitly
prompted further expansion of rights," but on the whole, Congress has
been comfortable in allowing courts to develop the basic contours of
of confusion factors to enable certain permitted uses. Likely confusion has to be proved even
with respect to an incontestable mark. This may, to some extent, explain the Ninth Circuit's
original formulation of the nominative fair use test, where the court found that the nominative
fair use test replaced or complemented the likelihood of confusion factors in a typical
infringement case. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a likelihood-
of-confusion test would tend to lead to the incorrect conclusion that "virtually all nominative
uses are confusing" because when a defendant uses a trademark nominally, a defendant can be
expected to use a plaintiff's identical mark). Although there are costs to explaining what is in
truth a balance of competing values in terms of mere confusion, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Trademark Law and Social Norms 24 (Sept. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Iowa Law Review), these cases also show that, in contexts where the standard tests of confusion
do not operate well, courts have been willing to adapt them to effectuate the basic purposes of
trademark law. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 239; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
33. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) ("Traditional trademark
infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition . . . that has its sources in
English common law, and was largely codified in the Trademark Act of 1946.") (citations
omitted).
34. See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Protection Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996)).
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trademark protection consistent with its purpose, codifying (or implicitly
endorsing by silence) those developments where necessary."5
The trademark system thus stands in contrast to copyright law, to which
Dogan and Lemley analogize in arguing that the courts should await
congressional intervention prior to regulating online advertising." There is
no such thing as a federal common law copyright in the United States. 7
Copyright is a statutory grant. Although courts have always been important
in developing defenses in copyright law, 8 the grant of rights to control new
forms of exploitation of copyrighted works is, in theory, the province of
Congress. 9
Moreover, the fair use doctrine contained in section 107 of the
Copyright Act was an explicit attempt by Congress to codify judicial
developments without preventing that doctrine's further development by
the courts." Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act is of a different character. As
we suggested above, Section 33(b) need not wholly curb judicial innovation.
It was, however, expressly intended to provide greater certainty for
trademark owners by limiting defenses after incontestability.4' Of course,
Congress might on occasion need to step in where the language of the
enumerated defenses leaves insufficient scope for judicial endorsement of
socially desired uses.42
Thus, we do not preclude the courts from developing common law
defenses; indeed, our approach encourages them to do so. But we do reject
the idea that courts might not also have a role to play in ensuring the
effectuation of the purposes of trademark law in new commercial settings,
both social and economic.
35. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (discussing 1988
reforms); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 784 (1992) (Stevens J.,
concurring) (discussing trade dress protection).
36. See Dogan and Lemley, supra note 1, at 1685-87.
37. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
38. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1841).
39. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). As successive revisions of the Copyright Act have defined the
scope of the statute in more general, conceptual terms, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)
(providing that copyright shall subsist in "original works of authorship"), the statutory language
has in practice allowed the courts to adapt copyright protection to new technological forms of
exploitation.
40. SeeH.R.REP.NO. 64-1476, at 66 (1976).
41. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (interpreting
incontestability provisions).
42. If developments over time reveal that a particular range of desired conduct cannot be
accommodated within the defenses listed in section 33(b), cf Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp.,
110 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing treatment of functionality within language of
section 33(b)(4)), Congress has acted to affirm the legality of such third party uses. See
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, §201, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998)
(adding functionality as a preserved defense).
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D. TURNING GENERALIZA TIONS INTo Pm imsEs
Ultimately, Dogan and Lemley's Lanham Act interpretation isn't tied
very closely to the statutory language. Instead, their interpretation rests
heavily on the argument that because most confusion cases involve a
defendant promoting its own goods and services, all confusion cases should
be deemed to require it, even though the Lanham Act does not impose such
a requirement in express terms. Judge Posner explained the dangers of a
similar methodological approach in Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc.:
The scope of a rule is oftun ... here limited by its rationale. Or, to
make the same point differently, one way of going astray in legal
analysis is to focus on the semantics of a rule rather than its
purpose. Case 1 might say that a personal name could not be
trademarked in the circumstances of that case without proof of
secondary meaning. Case 2 might say that personal names cannot
be trademarked without proof of secondary meaning but might
leave off the qualifications implicit in the circumstances of the case.
And then in Case 3 the court might just ask, is the trademark at
issue a personal name? As we observed in AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic
Management Associates, Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1995), rules
of law are rarely as clean and strict as statements of them make
them seem. So varied and unpredictable are the circumstances in
which they are applied that more often than not the summary
statement of a rule-the terse formula that judges employ as a
necessary shorthand to preventjudicial opinions from turning into
treatises-is better regarded as a generalization than as the premise
of a syllogism.
43
Our disagreement with Dogan and Lemley here thus reflects a basic
methodological difference. They would define the parameters of potential
trademark liability by reference to the typical case; that is to say, starting with
the acts of infringement that constitute 90% of trademark cases, they would
impose a legal rule that makes those cases, by definition, the entire 100%.
We're uncomfortable with such a methodology, especially at this point in
time.44
43. Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2004).
44. Of course, for prudential reasons, courts may decide that it's not worthwhile to tease
out a rule that covers ten percent of the cases if the error or enforcement costs of doing so are
high. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at 1634 & n.169. While not labeled as such, such
prudential concerns appear to inform Dogan and Lemley's latest arguments. Thus, although
they first argued that non-trademark uses could not increase search costs, their justification for
the doctrine now (1) recognizes that non-trademark uses (i.e., uses that would not be sufficient
to establish rights) may confuse, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1687-88 ("If a defendant
is using a trademark in a deceptive product advertisement, that use can confuse consumers as to
source or affiliation even if the defendant has never shipped a product bearing the mark."); (2)
explicitly incorporates a balancing of costs, see id. at 1695 ("Preventing intermediaries from
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E. THE CorrINUING DIEFINITIONAL PROBI.EM
As Dogan and Lemley concede, "neither judges nor scholars have yet
articulated a satisfying definition of trademark use." 45 At bottom, Dogan and
Lemley's effort to formulate a surgical form of trademark use is likewise
unsatisfying because it doesn't resolve a fundamental problem with
trademark use doctrine: no one can settle on what "trademark use" means.46
Indeed, Dogan and Lemley are careful not to make much of their own
formulation. They expect that trademark use doctrine "can develop
inductively, building from clear cases in which the defendant does not use
the plaintiff's mark to identify or brand its goods or services," and they
decline to specify the doctrine's outer limits, saying that this must be left to
47litigation.
That's a surprising approach that seems incompatible with the goals
that trademark use doctrine is supposed to achieve. According to its
proponents, trademark use doctrine is designed to deliberately short-circuit
claims of trademark infringement by avoiding the messiness of the48
confusion analysis -particularly its fact-specificity, which is said to make
confusion analysis "ill-suited to early resolution of lawsuits"4 9 and subject to
manipulation by trademark owners that seek to extract rents from risk averse
defendants. 50 But that means that trademark use doctrine can't be measured,
flexible, or sensitive to context. It can't be an open-ended doctrine that
communicating accurate information to consumers interested in that information . . . does
sufficient harm to a free market that we think society should be willing to tolerate even a
substantial amount of confusion rather than countenance that harm."); id. at 1688 ("The
trademark use doctrine in the infringement context serves a quite different objective: it avoids a
chill on the speech and commercial activities of parties whose relationship to trademark
infringement is, at best, indirect"); and (3) incorporates references to error costs. See id. at
1682. The Supreme Court has, to some extent, adopted a prudential approach to limit the
scope of product design trade dress. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214
(2000). However, the Court reached its conclusion in Wal-Mart after substantial experience with
litigation over product-design trade dress claims. No such similar experience yet exists for
online consumer search practices and trademark litigation regarding those practices.
45. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1673; see also Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1, at
1647-49.
46. For example, Dogan and Lemley argue that "if some unauthorized party sells shirts or
shoes emblazoned with the Nike swoosh or the JUST DO IT logo, she is engaged in both
trademark use and infringement: she has used Nike's trademark as a device to sell her own
product and has done so in a way that is likely to confuse the relevant public." Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 1, at 1696. But judges advancing the trademark use theory in other countries might
disagree about whether unauthorized merchandizing activity will always amount to trademark
use. See Arsenal Football Club v. Reed, (2001) 25 R.P.C. 922, 922-23 (Ch.), later proceeding, Case
C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 1-10273, at 604 (ECJ) (EU).
47. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1682.
48. Id. at 1693 (arguing in favor of "[c]reating a doctrine that can be applied pretrial to
short-circuit" claims of trademark infringement that are deemed dubious).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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develops inductively on a case-specific basis. If it is, then trademark use
doctrine won't be a reliable tool for short-circuiting claims. Worse, at least
for those who seek bright-line rules, it could become a largely redundant
quasi-confusion analysis, 5' also confirming our argument that use is a proxy
52for other values, including confusion.
This dissonance between policy goals and doctrinal implementation
leaves us deeply skeptical of the whole enterprise of creating a trademark
use doctrine. The trademark use doctrine is simply not an effective surgical
tool for defining the "normative boundaries within which the likelihood-of-
confusion doctrine can operate,"53 but is instead a clumsy stratagem for
rendering a priori judgments without the benefit of a contextual inquiry.
While we agree with Dogan and Lemley that trademark law needs effective
doctrines that balance the value of confusion-avoidance against other values
such as free speech, 54 courts should continue to develop established
doctrines such as the fair use defenses (which call for explicit, contextual
balancing of those values), rather than constructing a trademark use
requirement (which precludes courts from considering the confusion-
avoidance side of the equation).
II. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS:
THE PROBLEM OF IMMUNIZING INTERMEDIARIES
In Confusion Over Use, we laid out the normative case against the
trademark use doctrine. =' Dogan and Lemley have offered a number of
arguments in response. Below, we address three of those arguments,
showing how each reaffirms our conclusion that adopting a trademark use
doctrine would be bad trademark policy.
51. As Dogan and Lemley acknowledge, "[slometimes it is impossible to determine
whether a defendant is using a mark to indicate its products' source or sponsorship without
resorting to the type of consumer-perception analysis that sits at the core of the likelihood-of-
confusion test." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1673. We wholeheartedly agree; indeed, as we
pointed out in Confusion Over Use, a comparative analysis shows that courts confronted with
having to assess trademark use have struggled to make that assessment without conducting an
inquiry into consumer perception. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1643-45 & nn.212-
22.
52. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1697 ("The key question in trademark use cases is
whether defendants have used the mark in a way that suggests something about the source or
sponsorship of their own products or services.")
53. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1696.
54. Id. at 1674 (referring to "the historical balance of trademark law, which aims to
prevent specific instances of harmful confusion without casting the net so wide as to inhibit
truthful, information-enhancing speech"); accord Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1656.
55. Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at Part III.
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A. THE' CONTRIBUTORYINFRINGEMENT1'ARGUMENT
According to Dogan and Lemley, the contributory infringement
doctrine answers many of the objections that we raise in Confusion Over Use.
The contributory infringement argument operates on at least two levels:
first, it is said to provide the missing historical support for the existence of
the trademark use doctrine;56 second, it is supposed to provide appropriate
policing of Internet intermediaries involved in keyword advertisingd. 17
disputes. While the contributory infringement argument is intriguing, it
falls apart upon scrutiny.
The argument that contributory infringement supplies historical
support for the existence of a trademark use doctrine goes something like
this: in a few cases, some involving pre-Lanham Act claims of unfair
competition, courts imposed liability on those who facilitated acts of unfair
competition by others, adopting a theory of indirect or contributory liability.
The fact that courts found the facilitators indirectly liable is said to signify
that (1) courts must have been applying a rule that direct liability always
requires a showing of a trademark use, and (2) the facilitators' activities
must not have constituted trademark use, leaving the court only indirect
liability as a viable theory. If courts had not been implicitly observing a
trademark use requirement, they simply would have found that the
facilitator was a direct infringer, according to Dogan and Lemley's analysis.
This, say Dogan and Lemley, is the "most compelling evidence" for the
existence of an (implicit) trademark use requirement.
Given the paucity of historical support for the existence of a trademark
use doctrine, that may be true, but the contributory infringement cases
really aren't terribly compelling for the proposition that Dogan and Lemley
advance. The contributory infringement cases don't mention trademark use,
and, as far as we're aware, no one at the time or any time since (until Dogan
and Lemley) suggested that indirect liability emerged because it was the only
way to work around the constraints of the (implicit) trademark use
doctrine. 59 Dogan and Lemley are entitled to their inferences, but the cases
yield many other inferences that are equally (or more) plausible. For
example, we think it's entirely plausible that courts invoked indirect liability
not because they thought they had no other choice, but because it was
handy and familiar. In a case like William R. Warner,60 the Court didn't need
to ask the question about whether the defendant was a direct infringer
56. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1678-81.
57. Id. at 1689-91.
58. Id. at 1678.
59. The argument also appears in an amicus brief co-authored by Professor Dogan and
filed by a group of law professors in the Rescue.com case. See Brief for Intellectual Property Law
Faculty as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Rescue.com Corp. v. Google, Inc., Appeal
No. 06-4881-CV.
60. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1924).
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because the Court was persuaded that the defendant was facilitating
infringment, and imposing indirect liability on a facilitator was a routine
application of tort principles; the tort of unfair competition was no different
from other torts. Perhaps this explains why the Court tossed off its indirect
liability rule without substantial discussion.6'
Nonetheless, the contributory infringement doctrine is terrifically
important to the Dogan and Lemley normative vision of trademark law, at
least as it applies to keyword advertising cases. In that vision, search engines
may be potentially liable for indirect infringement for the sale of keywords
(and, thus, their business practices might be subject to some degree of
62
oversight). Thus, courts can freely adopt a (surgical) trademark use
doctrine to immunize those intermediaries from exposure to direct
trademark infringement liability.
But any oversight provided by this scheme is illusory and inadequate.
Contributory infringement requires evidence of an underlying direct
• 63
infringement. Many of the arguments proffered to insulate Internet
intermediaries from direct liability under a trademark use doctrine would
also apply to insulate their customers-the purchasers of keywords-and
there would thus be no direct liability to which the intermediaries could be
contributing. 64 Moreover, indirect infringement generally requires intent or
knowledge, which is hard to prove. Thus, to say that Internet intermediaries
face the risk of only indirect trademark liability is to say that intermediaries
will likely face no liability in all but the rather extreme cases.65
61. Id. at 530-31 (devoting two brief sentences to the recitation of the legal rules).
62. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1689-91.
63. The principle is well-settled-for example, in the law of patent infringement, which
has influenced indirect infringement rules in other areas of intellectual property law. See, e.g.,
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("When
indirect infringement is at issue, it is well settled that there can be no inducement or
contributory infringement absent an underlying direct infringement.").
64. Indeed, recent case law bears this out. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health
Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that the purchase of
a keyword was not an act of trademark use). And, to the extent that some indirect liability for
search engines might flow from the purchaser's direct liability, this too would (under the
trademark use theory) only cover a sliver of the conduct that might create confusion for
consumers, namely where the defendant's online advertising itself amounted to trademark
infringement. This fails to address possible confusion created by search engine conduct that is
independent of advertiser conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
65. Nor is it likely that the Lanham Act's false advertising provisions would provide a
robust alternative for finding liability for search engines. Cf Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 821 (2004)
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs] (asserting that keyword purchasers might be liable
for false advertising under some circumstances). Indeed, a closer reading of the false
advertising provision merely confirms the folly of reading "use in commerce" identically in
every place that it appears in the Lanham Act. See supra Part I. Section 43(a)(1)(B) provides
liability where one person misrepresents the nature of another person's goods or services in
commercial advertising. But that misrepresentation also must, under the argument advanced by
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Finally, the contributory infringement argument makes too little of the
fact that intermediaries might not only be facilitating harms caused by
others, but might also be perpetrating a separate harm themselves.
Theoretically, contributory infringement is the doctrine aimed at expanding
the pool of persons responsible for a single act that causes harm; this is why
facilitation only attracts liability when direct infringement later occurs. But
the sale of keyword-triggered advertising and the manner of presentation of
search results potentially create independent trademark-related harm, thus
• •• 66
making it an appropriate subject of direct liability. Whether consumers are
confused in an actionable way by the form in which a search engine presents
results on a web page does not turn on the "context of the advertiser's
statements and status."67
Of course, experience with the online provision of information may
ultimately demonstrate that offering broad immunity to search engines or
other intermediaries is sound trademark policy. It might also reveal that the
type of confusion, if any, induced by the presentation of results by search
engines is not the type of confusion against which the Lanham Act guards.
But the record is currently too thin to decide that matter a priori for all
future cases. That is the nub of the problem with injecting trademark use
into the legal framework for trademark keyword cases: trademark use
doctrine is too presumptuous, cutting off the contextual analysis on the basis
that we already know how it will (or should) come out.
B. INCEN'FIZJNG A MARKET RESPONSE THROUGH POTEV7IAL LIABILIY
Another point on which our normative analysis differs from that of
Dogan and Lemley concerns the disciplining effect of potential trademark
liability. Dogan and Lemley frame the normative debate over trademark use
as a choice between imposing limits on trademark holder rights or, on the
other hand, allowing trademark holders to "assert a new and unprecedented
form of trademark infringement."6 8 But our approach neither ensures that
trademark owners will obtain control over new types of uses of their marks
nor guarantees parties or intermediaries that they can make particular uses
trademark use theorists, qualify as a "use in commerce" because that phrase appears in the
preamble of section 43(a) (1). But cf Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra, at 836 (claiming that
"[elven if the advertiser manages to mislead without making a trademark use, other doctrines,
such as false advertising, may prevent such conduct"). To limit use in commerce in this context
to only a defendant's promotion of its own goods or services would nullify the express language
of section 43(a) (1) (B), extending liability to misrepresentations about another's goods. See U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting the
1988 statutory revision to ensure that statements about one's own goods or the goods of
another could be actionable).
66. Of course, if the advertising practices facilitate trademark infringement by the
advertisers, then contributory infringement liability might be appropriate.
67. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1690.
68. Id. at 1670.
1717
92 IOWA LAWREVIEW
of marks. Instead, our basic point is that it is inconsistent with the basic
purposes of trademark and unfair competition law to treat entire sections of
commercial activity as beyond the reach of the Lanham Act. Our argument
simply insists that those who, without authorization, use marks in commerce
in connection with the sale of goods or provision of services, are potentially
subject to liability if those uses cause effects that come within the scope of
trademark and unfair competition law.
Dogan and Lemley decry the "waste and inefficiency" that allegedly
would result from potential trademark liability, claiming that
"manufacturers would either overspend on enforcement, redesign their
products in suboptimal ways, or curtail the scope of their sales to avoid the
risk of strict liability."69 In fact, experience shows that search engines have
made, on the whole, good faith efforts to revise their selling practices and
redesign the presentation of search results in ways that take account of
trademark rights.70 We do not doubt that in some circumstances there is
over-enforcement, just as in other cases there is under-enforcement.
However, the response of search engines to potential liability under the
Lanham Act in redesigning their sales policies shows the value of not
excluding whole categories of uses of marks from the scope of potential
liability.7"
Furthermore, advocates of the trademark use theory as applied to
search engines overstate the consequences of liability, if that is found. In
particular, courts would be unlikely to halt the use of contextual online
advertising. Instead, consistent with the remedial approach of courts in
trademark and unfair competition law in a number of cases where there are
competing values at stake, courts would likely require search engines to
present results in ways that minimize the likelihood of confusion and to sellS 72
advertising in ways that are similarly motivated.
69. Id. at 1691.
70. See Peter W. Becker et al., Muddy Waters: Evolving Law and Policy in Internet Advertising
28 (Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the International Trademark Association, May 2007)
(on file with the Iowa Law Review).
71. Recent experience also tends to refute the exaggerated fears of commercial caution
that Dogan and Lemley invoked, suggesting that potential trademark liability has not, in fact,
produced a "world in which intermediaries, for fear of liability, fail to use consumer-generated
trademark signals at all in designing their business models." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at
1672. We think that this is because, as indicated above, many have in good faith structured their
business models to minimize the possibility of confusion. Assessing that conduct as a matter of a
defense that includes a good-faith component allows trademark law to encourage such
behavior. On the other hand, under a legal regime in which sales of keywords never constitute
trademark use, trademark law would provide no impetus to search engines to develop best
practices regarding online advertising. And good faith in seeking to avoid confusion would be
irrelevant to such analysis. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1654-56.
72. Cf FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., No. 06-CV-225 (JFB)(AKT), 2007
WL 1821153, at *5 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2007) (rejecting plaintiff request to impose a
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One might argue that market forces alone will move search engines
toward more transparency in the way that they present search results. After
all, search engines are in the business of delivering useful information
efficiently and can be assumed to be highly sensitive to consumer
preferences about Internet search results. So, if consumers find it
problematic to deal with a search results page that intermingles paid results
with organic results, they will (eventually) shift to other competing search
engines whose results present paid and organic links more straightforwardly.
Economically rational search engines, responding to (presumably)
economically rational consumers, will discipline themselves, and trademark
law, the argument goes, will need to play no significant role.
It's difficult to take this argument seriously, despite its superficial
appeal. Experience militates against the pure laissez-faire approach. Even if
the market ultimately punishes producers that mislead their customers,
search engines evidently can present increasingly indistinct organic and paid
results and still capture short-term gains. Were it otherwise, of course, one
might question whether there was any need for trademark and unfair
competition law.
C. OImTdNE ANALOGIES AD THE PROXIMATE PLACEMENT ARGUMENT
As we argued in Confusion Over Use, we see the trademark use doctrine
(as defined by scholars) as a newly-minted doctrine created for the purpose
of resolving keyword cases but having (perhaps unforeseen) implications
that transcend those cases. 73 Dogan and Lemley see the trademark
infringement allegations against keyword sales as a new and unwelcome
extension of trademark rights.74 To bolster this claim, Dogan and Lemley
invoke a clever (albeit well-worn) offline analogy: an Internet search
engine's sale of COKE as a keyword to trigger advertisements for Joe's Cola
is analogous to a grocery store's sale of shelf space to allow bottles of Joe's
Cola to be placed adjacent to bottles of COKE. According to this argument,
just as the law doesn't impose trademark liability on grocery stores for
proximate placement, the law shouldn't impose such liability on Internet
intermediaries. And, importantly, the decision to shield proximate
placement of grocery products is a consequence of the trademark use
doctrine; the grocery story isn't liable because it isn't engaging in a
trademark use.' "
"negative matching" obligation on the defendant purchaser of keywords linked to the plaintiff's
trademark).
73. Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at Part 11I.C.
74. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1670-71.
75. Id. at 1692-93.
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That's an attractive narrative-one that some courts have already found
compelling. 76 But we have several problems with it. First, even if the online
and offline practices are analogous such that the outcomes in both scenarios
should be the same, trademark use doctrine isn't inevitably the most
normatively desirable vehicle for achieving those outcomes. We might just as
plausibly say that when grocery stores first engaged in proximate placement,
a contextual inquiry that considered a balance of values (the risk of
confusion, the benefits of providing truthful comparative information to
consumers) might have led to the conclusion that a particular practice
simply wasn't confusing or should be deemed a fair use. Experience over
time (with multiple opportunities for contextual balancing of various
proximate placement activities) may have reinforced these conclusions and
eventually established norms of proximate placement activity that carried
minimal risk of trademark liability. 77 Whether this is what actually occurred
is beside the point; the point is that trademark law's well-established
contextual analysis possesses the capacity for dealing with the proximate
placement scenario without the invocation of a trademark use doctrine.
So, what if our version of the narrative isn't quite right, and some court,
somewhere, rejects the trademark use doctrine, engages in a contextual
analysis, and finds that some particular grocery store's proximate placement
practice gives rise to likely confusion?7 8 The implication that we take from
Dogan and Lemley's work is that they predict that grocery stores would
dramatically change their sales practices-for example, by rearranging their
stores so that rivals' respective products were never offered for sale on
adjacent shelves. But again, this overstates the power of trademark rights
and the probable scope of any injunctive relief. A court could tailor
injunctive relief narrowly to match the modest harm-for example, by
requiring simple labeling on store shelves (or, online, by requiring that
sponsored search results be segregated from organic search results and
plainly labeled as such).
76. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005); cf
Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. 1159950, 2007 WAL 1159950, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (rejecting Google's trademark use argument but asserting that "Google's
analogies to trademark infringements outside the digital realm are attractive").
77. WAe suspect that this parallels, in many respects, the debate that took place in the
context of private label goods.
78. The possibility that consumer and commercial practices might build up around rogue
decisions is, however, a fair general concern that trademark law need to address. See Dinwoodie,
Trademark Law and Social Norms, supra note 32, at 21. Dogan and Lemley fear not only this
outcome, but also worry about a ripple effect. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1672
(worrying that Amazon.com would hesitate to recommend alternative products to shoppers on
its website, that critics would be stifled because they would decline to risk using a firm's marks
in criticizing that firm, that writers would expunge references to trademarks from their works,
and so on).
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Moreover, the all-too-ready resort to offline analogies to justify
outcomes in Internet trademark cases gives us pause. Courts should not
automatically assume that proximity in the online environment and
proximity in the offline environment have the same effects. The context is
different, and there are great risks in taking analogies too seriously. The
effects and economic function of contextual advertising may be radically
different from side-by-side placement of goods in grocery stores,
notwithstanding that, under some form of formalistic common law
reasoning, these activities share the characteristic of placing marks in
proximity to each other.7 9
III. CONCLUSION
Trademark law is capable of playing a constructive role in facilitating
commercial discourse and in accommodating the interests of competitors, as
well as consumers. The trademark use doctrine as articulated by Dogan and
Lemley strives to "ground" trademark law by banishing it from certain areas
of endeavor without inquiring about contextual factors that are central to
the confusion analysis. Notwithstanding the arguments of accomplished
scholars such as Dogan and Lemley, we continue to think that trademark law
and the values that it seeks to promote, would be worse off for such a
grounding. But the debate about trademark use might at least offer lessons
about methodology that will be valuable for trademark law in a broader
range of contexts than the keyword advertising disputes where the debate is
currently playing out.
79. See Dinwoodie &Janis, supra note 1, at 1635 & nn.176-77.
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